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The decline of Iberia in the sixteenth century shook the foundations of world trade and 
politics, undermining Spain's Asian and American trade monopolies and creating the international 
opening that spurred other European states and merchants in the contest for overseas markets. 
After the waves had subsided in the seventeenth century, the world system had been reconfigured. 
The United Provinces of the Netherlands had become the first truly global commercial power -- the 
first "hegemon".2 The rise of the Netherlands to the position of world hegemony is a t  first glance 
startling. The seven provinces had a relatively small population (some 1.5 million inhabitants in 
1600, compared to 10 million in Spain and Portugal, and 16-20 million in neighboring France), 
. . - . : .-:and. had..formed: part-of~~the:Low~Countries;.an uneasily- aggregated group of.seigneuries, cities and 
. -. provinces-under.Spanish rule until.the-15'70s. Even after the Dutch Revolt against Spain had 
begun, the Dutch were enmeshed in a bitter.war of independence that ended only in 1648. The 
- . Netherlands appeared to be an-also-ran. Why, then,.its:surprising success? This question is worth 
answering, not only because of its intrinsic historical interest, but also because it illuminates 
processes of early modern European development, and the mechanisms of politico-economic 
development more generally. 
This paper will argue that the nexus of patrimonial state and merchant elite was a key 
component of the Dutch trajectory. This factor was a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of the 
rise of the Netherlands and the genesis of a global political economy, which the Dutch helped 
create. The merchant-controlled state spun off semi-sovereign corporate bodies such as the East 
and West Indies Companies, also dominated by merchant capitalists, which helped establish the 
The causes of the decay of Iberian hegemony are complex and contested, and cannot be 
discussed here. For an overview, see Elliott (1967: 177-205). 
In this paper, the Low Countries refer to what is basically the present.-day Netherlands and 
Belgium; the Netherlands and the Dutch Republic to the seven United Provinces (Holland, 
Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, Groningen, Friesland, as well as Drenthe, which later 
became a separate province) and their contiguous dependent territory; and Holland to the largest 
of the provinces. 
Dutch world trading system. At the zenith of the seventeenth-century Golden Age (Gouden Eeuw), 
however, the state's spinoff corporations pursued policies that were increasingly at odds with one 
c 
another. I will argue that this contradiction animated a struggle between the mercantile 
companies, which weakened the western arm of Dutch colonialism. As the luster of the Golden 
Age dimmed, and the hegemonic position was surrendered to England, this weakness played a 
part in Dutch decline. 
My argument revises and builds on previous sociological theories for which the 
Netherlands has represented both a touchstone and a troublesome anomaly. Most influential, and 
of particular concern here, is world-systems theory, which from its inception has recognized the 
centrality of the ~ u t c h  case.3 This paper argues that world-system theory identifies important 
--- 
preconditions for the rise of the Dutch and the capitalist world-system, but bypasses others, - 
notably the specific role of nascent states and intercorporate dynamics in creating and maintaining 
..- ' the conditions within which merchant capitalism and the Dutch Golden Age flourished. I then . L' . 
-.,.: . "--. proceed to offer an alternative approach, emphasizing the unique configuration of social :.-.--.., - 
structures, political and economic, national and international, that first promoted -- and then - 
r- -..... 
...,-. undermined -- Dutch hegemony. The body of the paper is divided into five sections. The first is - 
theoretical, providing a brief discussion and critique of pertinent world-systems arguments, and 
introducing the concept of patrimoriialism as an entree into a configurational way of thinking 
about the "peculiarities of the Dutch". The second and third parts explore the role of the 
patrimonial statelmerchant nexus in the Dutch rise to power, and the fourth deploys historical 
counterfactual arguments to deal with the subsequent history of intercorporate struggle, which left 
an indelible mark on the construction of Dutch colonialism. The paper closes by reflecting on the 
implications for our understanding of the decline of the Netherlands and its displacement as 
hegemon. 
In addition to Wallerstein (1974, 1980), see Boswell e t  al. (1991), Boswell and Misra 
(forthcoming), and Misra and Boswell (1993), which have recently addressed the Dutch case from 
within a world-systems framework. See also Klein's (1982) early, dismissive, critique of world- 
systems theory, offered in the context of a conference on Dutch capitalism. 
World Svs t em and Patrim-onial S t a b  
The of the capitalist world-system in the sixteenth century was an unprecedented 
phenomenon.4 For the first time, according to Wallerstein, economic specialization and 
rationalization, rather than imperial force, became the major source of the surplus that reproduded 
social life. These processes were associated with "more efficient and expanded productivity," i nd  
the profit they generated was realized by exchange on the nascent world market (Wallerstein 
1974: 38). In the earliest stages, merchants from western Europe carrying capital-intensive mass 
consumption goods like herring, salt, wine and textiles traded with Baltic countries, which offered 
grain and timber in exchange. Trade in bulk necessities is thought to have "commercialized 
. .-everyday life, fostering capitalist  relation^,"^ and by the same token inducing regional 
' -. ; -:; specialization: the.West.developed anindustrial .base and.the East lapsed into a second serfdom in 
its predominantly agrarian economy. Thus the initial core of the world economy came to be located 
.in. the Netherlands (and some parts of England and France) by 1600, and the first periphery in 
Russia, Poland, Prussia, and ~cand inav ia .~  
What began as a geographically limited world economy in the sixteenth century 
encompassed the globe, as core areas engrossed modern agriculture and industry, and peripheral 
areas adopted labor-intensive production and monocultures. The far-flung division of labor was 
A world-system may be defined as  a unit with a single division of labor -- by which is meant an 
economic division of labor -- that is "both organized and paralleled by a single set of accumulation 
processes" (Hopkins 1982: 11). 
See Boswell e t  al. (199 1). The exchange of "luxury" or prestige goods may have been equally 
important in generating and sustaining the first global trading system, as Jane Schneider (1991) 
has hypothesized. These goods and the wealth they concentrated were distributed in ways that 
reinforced core elite hierarchies, and were used to manipulate subordinates (such as  semi- 
peripheral or middle-level groups) through patronage relationships. The relative role of bulk 
necessities and prestige goods in the rise of capitalism is still an open question, and not only 
among world-systems theorists. See the debate in the special issue of the Dutch journal Wschr i fk  
(1992), "Het Hollandse Wonder." 
World-systems analyses follow Fernand Braudel in emphasizing the critical role of the secular 
rise in bulk trades as  the basis of Dutch commercial hegemony. See Braudel (1982: 66-67). 
simultaneously reinforced by expioit.ative relations on the ground, a s  ruling elites in core areas 
began to siphon off surpluses from peripheral territories, even selecting the most profitable form of 
labor organization in the areas they actively controlled (Wallerdtein 1980: Chapter Two). Trade 
was the principal mechanism for shifting this surplus, playing a functionally analogous role to that 
of the political machinery in a world-empire, which served to force flows of tribute to the center. I t  
would be difficult to overstate the importance of trade in world systems theory; it both conveys 
and creates economic surplus under capitalism.7 
The Dutch case is therefore an ideal vehicle for a critical dialogue with world-systems 
theory. The Dutch were, as  the eighteenth-century novelist Daniel Defoe put it, "the Carryers of 
- - the World, the middle persons in Trade, the Factors and Brokers of ~ u r o ~ e . " ~  Indeed, they built 
-.- "-. 
*-**r--- 
the quintessential trading state. Small wonder that the Dutch case occupies an important place in 
. &V. C-L. . 
."' - '.P. Wallersteinys texts and later world-systems work. Explicating the workings of the Dutch system 
*-..-<'A*-- - 
must surely be the acid test of a theory purporting to explain the levers of exchange and 
-:* - 
. - -- expansion underlying the emergent world economy. 
-P- ".,7-2 % 
In spite of their focus on the total system, world-systems theorists can and do ask why a 
t - .  
-- specific region or country assumes a hegemonic position within the overall s t r u ~ t u r e . ~  In the early - 
Klein (1982: 88-90) is unconvinced that Dutch hegemony derives from mechanisms of surplus 
appropriation. He argues that the Dutch supplied and linked production factors in novel ways, 
leading to the positive-sum growth of world trade. Both arguments can be made within the 
framework of world-systems theory, however, and they do not seem to me to be mutually 
exclusive. 
Defoe (1728), quoted in Israel (1989: 398). Defoe could afford to be neutral in this instance, 
since Dutch dominance had already waned. Compare the seventeenth-century poet Andrew 
\ 
Marvell's vitriolic diatribe, "The Character of Holland", "this indigested vomit of the Sea". 
(Marvel1 1972: 112-16) 
Important social features and dynamics are supposed to take place on the level of the whole 
system rather than emanating from relatively autonomous societies or states. "The premise is 
that the arena within which social action takes place and social change occurs is not "society" in 
the abstract, but a definite "world", a spatio-temporal whole, whose spatial scope is coextensive 
with the elementary division of labor among its constituent regions or parts and whose temporal 
scope extends for a s  long a s  the elementary division of labor continually reproduces the "world" as  
a social whole (whether on an expanding, contracting, or unchanging scale)" (Hopkins et  al. 1982: 
42). 
modern period, the most successful should have been those'thit managed .b specialize i n  the skills 
needed to command the central place in the'emerging world-economy. They weie best, that is, a t  
exploiting discrepancies between production costs and the price of goods, and mbst effedtive a t  
maintaining their control over costlprice differentials -- whether by depressing exp&ses (often by 
coerced labor), raising prices monopolizing markets), lowering transaction costs & cutting 
costs of transport), or some combination of these strategies. They also relied on the "non-market 
assist of state machineries" to support the economic goals of their dominant capitalist. classes. 
Tlieir "strong stat&" enforced and fought over the terms of trade under which exchange took 
place, without intervening directly in economic production and extraction themselves (~al lers tein 
1974: 38, 200). 
. ,: ,4 %.,, ,-. . - 'Taking::the;.above-.premises.!as:givensfor: the.moment,. a world-systems . theorist's ansu7er to 
... .. , ,:,., . , . - ..- ,. .:. ,-why-the: Dutch.,were..best equipped:to take -advantage:.oPthe fall: of..the.Iberian -empire -would stress 
:three basic factors. First, -northwest Europe.had significant geographic advantages, and the 
. . 4 .  - . - I 6  .:-iNeicherlands.;.in;.pa~ticular -.was located-.at+the.nexus .of.European.trade .routes, accessible by sea, 
three.major rivers, and an extensive canal network. These features helped the Dutch take 
advantage of the new commercial opportunities (Walierstein 1974: 266, 272). Second, technical 
and organizational innovations lowered the production and transaction costs of trading for 
merchants operating in the Netherlands' sphere of influence. Innovations in shipping and 
shipbuilding were particularly important in cutting costs of transport and exchange W: 212-13, 
265). Finally, relative state strength was a factor in enforcing the advantage, although the way 
that factor came into play is disputed. Holland was simply stronger than other contending states 
a t  this juncture, according to Boswell et al. (1991). Wallerstein disagrees: "Holland was no 
political threat, unlike France and England," stressing instead the dearth of other candidates for 
the position that were weak enough to be acceptable to Spain (the fading, bu t  still powerful world 
empire). Thus, he claims, the early modern Dutch state could obtain the best terms of exchange 
for merchants in a relatively peaceful, even apolitical fashion. "Her route. to riches was not that of 
the incipient mercantilism of other states -- essential for long-run advantage but not for 
5 
maximizing short-run profit by the mercantile and financial classes. Her route was the route of 
free trade" (Wallerstein 1974: 213). I will take strong issue with this point beiow.1° 
There is mcch to be valued in world-systems theory, and in its specific arguments with 
respect to the Netherlands. First, it seems clear that processes of economic specialization and 
rationalization were key in a number of sectors that linked up with and supported expanding 
global trade. In agriculture, these processes were underway by mid-century, especially in Holland, 
and agrarian autarky was eroding. Data are scarce and unreliable, but several factors indicate 
that there was a rise in production for supra-regional markets: (1) the rise in Baltic grain imports 
and the shift of farmers away from bread grains to dairy farming and horticultural crops like flax, 
hops and hemp; (2) the growth of population without an increase in rural underemployment; (3) an 
. ,. 
c.j,>.,q++-. .. -Lra:. .- influx of labor and capital into interregional and international trade in bulk commodities (Jan de 
%& r4A- r. '- 
Vries 1974: 71-3, 165-73; Van Houtte 1964). 
..*; "-% This feat was possible, it must be pointed out, because the characteristic economic mode of 
,.:&is':z. 
production in the northern provinces in the sixteenth century was petty commodity production, 
kc+T.:-. ... - which raised fewer barriers than a legacy of feudalism to agrarian development. Agrarian 
-M.~+z:.~L . feudalism had never predominated to the extent that it had in the southern provinces, or in France 
or England, and had not been implanted a t  all in the coastal and northern provinces.12 It is also 
lo In his la& work, Wallerstein moves closer to arguing for the relative strength, rather than 
weakness, of the Dutch state. See Wallerstein (1980: Chapter Two). Note that the above 
paragraph is a more generous reading of Wallerstein than one which simply lists all the factors 
mentioned in his texts, since these factors do not always follow from the theoretical premises. For 
example, he lists a s  additional causes of the rise of the Dutch "cumulating economic advantage" 
(1974: 212), which is an ad hoc addition, and the "relative financial soundness of state" W: 
213), a variable which is inexplicable within the terms of the theory. 
l1 This argument derives from an important strand of Marxism, which emphasizes the degree to 
which the character of production relations structures the role and economic impact of merchant 
capital. For the kernel of this argument, see Marx (1967 iii: 325-3 1). Brenner (1977, 1985) 
developed it further with respect to the genesis of capitalism in western Europe, and criticized 
world-systems theory on that basis. The argument in this paper may be seen as  complementary to 
Brenner's critique. 
l2 See Jongkees (1942: 206-14) and Vlekke (1945: 106-11). In the poorer and more thinly 
populated eastern agricultural provinces, notably Overijssel, feudalism had been more pervasive, 
and the rural nobility had more power (Slicher van Bath 1957i). 
true that t.he development of capitalist production relations eventually restructured relatively 
homogeneous groups of petty commodity producers, making Dutch agriculture the most technically 
advanced and highly productive in Europe by the eighteenth century. l3 No &ibt  this ' 
' 
restructuring helped the Netherlands sustain the hegemonic moment. At this early stage, 
however, agrarian development was probably driven by rationalization and intensification of 
cultivation, as  world-systems theory would suggest, rather than a fundamental shift in class 
relations away from petty commodity production. l4 
Furthermore, geography and technical and organizational innovations enabled the 
commercial and manufacturing sectors to absorb and deploy the increased inputs of labor and 
capital freed up by the agrarian sector. As Wallerstein notes, the merchants of the Low Countries 
- . .- -: r _were'among:thoser-merchants geographically-.positioned so as  tocbe able to yoke together the 
. ... ..~r~~~northem~European-markets;:where grain anddsalted fish, furs, woollens, wood and iron were 
exchanged. Antwerp was northern Europe's entrepot for textiles and ~ s i a n ' ~ r o d u c t s  in the mid- 
; 3 ,: -~skteenth:century ((Ramsay 1986);. while-Amsterdam served as  the staple-for the world grain 
trade, the so-called "mother trade" (moederneeotie), underpinned by the rising agricultural exports 
(Den Haan 1977: 27-31; North and Thomas 1973; Van der Wee 1988: 25-33). As early as 1540, 
Hollanders claimed a seagoing fleet of 400 ships, "greater in numbers (they said) than all the 
merchantmen of England, France, and Brittany combined" (Tracy 1985: 195). Improvements such 
as the efficient flute ship (fluvtschip) and the rederu system, in which commercial and shipping 
ventures were divided into small shares, dispersed risk and lowered interest rates, enabling Dutch 
l3 In a region of Friesland studied by Jan de Vries, the peasantry gave way by the eighteenth 
century to the familiar agrarian capitalist triad of landlords, capitalist tenant farmers, and wage 
laborers..A s i d a r  tendency prevailed in Holland, except that landlord and farmer were more 
likely to be the same person. Farm size increased, and the number of farmers shrunk with respect 
to the area population, while the number of non-land-holders grew. (De Vries 1974: 127-36) See 
Mokyr (1975: 296) regarding Dutch agricultural productivity in the early nineteenth century. 
l4 Van der Wee's (1978) work supplies what seems to me to be strong evidence for this point. His 
research has shown that the number of small farms actually increased in Holland during the 
sixteenth century, while their average size decreased. At the same time, however, money rents 
and yield ratios rose. 
merchants to cast a wide net for capital.15 These processes particularly stimulated economic 
growth in Holland and Zeeland (Van Dillen 1970: 239-48; Boxer 1965: 6-7). 
But the conjoint presence of these factors was not enough to guarantee commercial and 
financial ascendancy, or predominance in manufacturing -- and still less the combination of all 
three that confers hegemonic status. l6 Until the Revolt and the remaking of the state, large-scale 
Dutch merchants functioned primarily as  commercial and financial agents of merchants based in 
other regions. As Jonathan Israel has noted, access to the Baltic "rich trades" of spices, sugar and 
textile was contfolled by the merchants of Antwerp, Hamburg and Lubeck until the 1590s, and 
the grain trade to Italy was organized and financed by the established mercantile elites of Venice, 
Genoa, and Tuscany (Israel 1989; see also Van der Wee 1965-6: 267-85). In the textile industry 
4 s  
based in the town of Leiden, the large drapers were captive factors of the merchants of Calais and 
*. . the Hanseatic League until after the Revolt (Howell 1986: 67-9). Their dependent status acted as 
a brake on merchant intervention in production, and on the transformaticin of petty commodity 
..- , production carried out in master artisanal households (the dominant form until the 1590s) into 
capitalist manufactories. l7 Dependence extended to the Indies trades: Dutch merchants procured 
-. 
both .Asian pepper and spices, and Caribbean salt, from the Portuguese (Bruijn e t  al. 1979; Van - - 
Dillen 1970: 139-43; Goslinga 197 1: 116-25). While the groundwork had been laid for the linkage 
of the development of agrarian capitalism, world trade, urban manufacturing, and finance that 
l5 On these technical and organizational breakthroughs, see Jan  de Vries (1976: 118). Barbour 
(1950) notes that the paucity and expense of land in the Netherlands encouraged investors of all 
economic strata to put their savings into shares in ships, fishing, and land reclamation (and later, 
as  we shall see, in the state debt). 
16 Hopkins et  al. give a working definition of hegemony: when "no second power or combination of 
second powers seems capable of challenging effectively the economic supremacy of the strongest 
core power" (1982: 52). Wallerstein (1974) suggests that economic supremacy consists in 
predominance over world agro-industrial production, trade and finance, while Eioswell and Misra 
(forthcoming) opt for the domination of leading economic' sectors: in this period, trade. By either 
definition, the Netherlands was the hegemonic power for a large part of the seventeenth century. 
Sixty percent of the members of the town council of Leiden were involved in the key textile 
industry. Yet until the Revolt the council bowed to external constraint, restricting the numbers of 
cloths drapers could produce as  well a s  the level of their participation in international trade. See 
Howell (1986: 55, 69) and Posthumus (1908i: 275). 
took place in.the 1590s after the buster of.the Spanish, Dutch merchants had not yet tr&sformed 
themselves from passive channels of exchange into active initiators of trade and investment. 
The mechanism of transformation and missing ingredient was the sk&, a crucial factor in 
the rise of the Dutch. To its credit, world-systems theory has tried to highlight the role of politics 
in the rise of capitalism, deeming the presence of a "strong" state integral to surplus extraction 
and capital a c c ~ r n u l a t i o n . ~ ~  At times the strength of a state is equated with certain structural 
features, principally bureaucratization, military rat,ionalizatio and public finance, but this 
equation runs afoul of the fact that the Dutch state lacked these features, remaining what 
Wallerstein himself calls a "jerry-rigged" apparatus until the end of the early modern era (1980: 
38). i9 More often, and more consistently with respect to the theory, states are (1) functionally 
defined; and (2)-defined.in.terms-ofstheir specific function in maintaiiling the structure of the world 
,. -:L economy. By *definition::a,strong.core -state is expected-to secure market advantage and enforce 
the best terms of exchange for capitalists, a t  the expense of other strong states and weak states in 
- ithe-periphery or- semi-periphery . 
There are some serious problems with this line of reasoning; however. Most 
fundamentally, the assumption that the existence and form of a state is mandated by its function 
in a larger system, in this case the world economy, goes beyond functional description to reduction. 
Certainly the function of a given social structure may play a role in that structure's creation and 
reproduction. But to be credible, the argument should also show that either (1) social agents 
believed that that structure promised to fulfill such a function, and that their belief played a role 
in its genesis or maintenance, or (2) the creation of such a structure was an unintended 
l8 "Once we get a difference in the strength of the state machineries, we get the operation of 
"unequal exchange" which is enfoimced by strong states on weak ones, by core states on peripheral 
areas. Thus capitalism involves not only appropriation of surplua-value by an owner from a 
laborer, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole world-economy bg core areas" (Wallerstein 
1974: 401). This is a promising idea, although the mechanisms of surplus transfer have not been 
spelled out. 
l9 In her critical review of Wallerstein, Skocpol (1977) notes that this equation also forecloses 
analysis of why states with so-called strong features did in fact appear in the semi-periphery & 
Swedish absolutism). 
consequence of some other line of action.20 Given the basic assumptions of world-systems theory 
outlined above, no such mechanisms can be specified. On the contrary, the world-systems 
approach assumes that the ultimate success of a state's hegemonic project indicates both that the 
core state in question was necessarily a "strong" one, and that its policies emanated from an 
omniscient globally-oriented capitalist elite. These tautological assumptions make it impossible to 
examine either the variable relationships between states and classes (and fractions of classes), or 
the ways in which state power is systematically structured by institutional forms and patterned 
struggles within and among states. 
There are good theoretical and historical reasons for thinking that these things do matter, 
and that the concept of "strong state" is an inadequate tool for analyzing early modern European 
.-- 
--. ... - "T&y$- - - states. These were patrimonial states in the making, not fully constituted sovereign entities, as 
-2 
the concept of strong state implies. These nascent systems of rule were marked by a segmentation 
.: J Z  - 
-- or parcellization of sovereign power among the ruler (or rulers) and corporate elites. The - - 
. - - .  patrimonial ruler ruled, gathering funds and deploying power, by relying on self-governing - -  - 
' -  - corporations charged with key economic and political obligations, such as  estates, guilds, chartered -. . 
-- .- comp_a_nies, and so on, which were charged with the tasks of formulating and enforcing collectively 
binding decisions on the people and activities under their jurisdiction. Corporate elites derived 
economic resources, representation and symbolic legitimacy in return.21 
The interdependence between state and corporations was a basic feature of the system of 
rule, whether the patrimonial ruler dominated the state, in the absolutist tendency, or the elite- 
headed corporations did, in the estatist mode prevalent in the   ether lands.^^ Yet by the same 
20 Stinchcombe (1968: 80- 10 1) discusses the logical conditions under which functional reasoning is 
valid. 
For the concept of patrimonialism, see Max Weber (1968: 226, 293-97, 1006-7, 1010-13, 
1022, 1028-31). 
22 Regarding estatism, see Weber's comments on "rule by notables 0" (1968: 1009- 
10, 1038-42). The term "estatism" is preferable, in my view, because it makes explicit the 
conceptual and historical parallel to absolutism. 
. , . . 
token there were also permanent tensions between rilers and corporate bodies (since the latter 
. . 
typically aimed a t  both power and profit -- a t  maintaining their sovereign rights as  well as  
2 .  ' , ' .  
expand& their economic resources), a i d  among the cor$orations themselves, which wkre often 
assigned incompatible mandates and overlapping jurisdictions. Those tensions continued to'be 
developmentally significant until that time when states became superordinate powerholders and ' 
the political functions of the patrimonial corporatiins were subordinated or eliminated. 
In the Netherlands, I will argue, the relationship between patrimonial state and merchant 
class was unique among early modern European contenders for power, and estatist patrimonial 
structures of rule'are a cehtral part of the story of the Golden Age. The next two sections of the 
paper show how pntrimonialism reinforced the politico-economic privileges and powers of key 
- . -.. * : segments oFthe urban merchant- elite; firsisunder. the,.Habsburg crown;.and then.under the newly 
: . :; independent Dutch .state itself. 
State-Mere- .. usei . Revolution!~and State power i n  the ,Netherlan& 
While still the patrimonial overlord of the h w  Countries, the Habsburg crown had 
strengthened the position of the urban regent patriciate in several ways, a s  a counterweight to the 
nobility, which began to withdraw to rural'estates even before the Revolt (Van Nierop 1984). The 
Habsburg rulers supported the efforts of towns to buy up the remaining seigneuries around their 
walls and expand their control over the economic activities of their  hinterland^,^^ and also 
consulted towns and provincial States with respect to taxation and new laws, and (customarily) in 
decisions on war and peace that affected the provinces (Koenigsberger 1982: 103-04). Crown 
military projects and fiscal demands then molded pre-existing inter-urban networks into more 
organized arid potentially solidary provincial estates (Blockmans 1978), in which wealthy 
merchants occupied an usually powerful place, controlling the crucial town councils by the mid- 
23 See Jan  de Vries (1974: 48). The Netherlands were highly urbanized, with many sizeable 
towns rather than one or a few large ones. Fifty-two percent of Holland's population already lived 
in towns in 1514 (Baelde 1988: 69), and this percentage rose further during the sixteenth century 
(Jan de Vries 1984). 
sixteenth century. In Holland and Zeeland, most of the councillors were either ship-owners or 
directly involved in overseas trade (Boxer 1965: 7-8; Burke 1960: 30; Kossmann 1978: 5-8). 
The crucial stage of the Revolt began in 1572, when the relationship between crown and 
the Low Countries estates buckled under the combined pressures of financing Spain's war with 
France, the administrative efforts to bring the restive territories more firmly under Spanish 
control, and the Inquisition's effort to extirpate Protestant heresies and reimpose Catholic 
orthodoxy. Emperor Philip I1 was not successful in asserting politico-economic authority over the 
Dutch regents; the absolutist move failed. Instead, the regents captured the state, and the estatist 
tendency triumphed. The Dutch States-General gained effective sovereignty in part of the north by 
-- the mid-1570~~ and the delegates of several of the provincial States formed a defensive pact -- 
against Spain, known as  the Union of Utrecht, in 1579. The pact ultimately served as the basis of 
s&-y{- r 
. .. .. .- . the new state, although the territory it covered waxed and waned with the fortunes of the Eighty .-. -. 
Years ~ a r . 2 4  
As many historians have pointed out, the turning point for the Dutch Revolt hinged on a 
z -  r * 
i.wrrl .. . ---". 
,. , " ".- .. .. .. specific politico-economic intervention, which had positive consequences for Dutch mercantile 
i ....'_;. 
. + 
.<; - . . . . .. . accumulation and consolidation of political power. In 1585, the Dutch succeeded in blockading the .. 1 . , . .. 
- -. . Scheldt river after the Spanish recapture of Antwerp, and permanently preventing trading ships 
from reaching that city. The closing of the Scheldt ended Antwerp's role as  the key textile and 
Asian product entrepot, but Antwerp's loss was Amsterdam's gain. Some 60,000-120,000 
southern Netherlands refugees, fleeing economic hardship and religious persecution, brought their 
substantial capital and industrial and commercial skills to the north (Briels 1985: 213-28; Gaastra 
1982: 11). Amsterdam merchants were able to gain increasing leverage over the flourishing trade 
in raw wool (Van Houtte 1964). Textile manufacture in Holland towns boomed; in Leiden, it 
registered a rise from 38,130 pieces in 1588 to 73,047 in 1609 (Posthumus 1908-39 ii: 60-4, 107, 
24 Parker (1977) provides a concise English-language history of the upheaval. 
. I . .  
* In retaliation, Philip I1 (fi-om 158d-1640 a140 king of Portugal! embargoed all foreign ships 
in Iberian harbors in 1585, an action aimed primarily a t  the Dutch (Bruijn e t  al. 1987: 1-6; Boxer 
1965: 42). He followed this up in 1594 with a ban on Ijutch trade in the Americas (Van den 
Boogaart 1982: 115:6). The barriers to using Iberia as  the accustomed mercantile intermediary, 
. - 
coupled with the infusion of capital and skills from southern emigres and newly available 
knowledge about trade routes and territories, provided the means and impetus for Dutch 
merchants to initiate their own voyages to Asia in the 1590s, and after that precompanies 
(voorcom~agnieen) multiplied rapidly in Holland and Zeeland (Gaastra 1982: 11). By 160 1, 
fourteen fleets (sixty-five ships) had sailed to the East Indies, far more than even the Portuguese ' 
had sent in that period. Similar efforts at expansion took place in the Atlantic. Dutch merchants 
: . traded actively in Brazil despite Philip's ban, a d  smuggled salt out of the Caribbean, in spite of 
;.a -; ;':c.:.the declared-Spanish. monopoly.. From: 15.93, .;Holland. and. Zeeland :merchants .formedpr~companies 
I 
' to compete with Portuguese slave-traders on the Guinea coast (Van den ~ o o g a a r t  1982: 115-6; 
Van Dillen 1970: 139-43;..Goslinga 1971: 116-25). 
Traditional patterns of exchange based on bulk transshipment now broadened u, 
incorporate other high-value commercial streams in addition to East and West Indies trade. As 
Jonathan Israel shows, the Dutch advanced dramatically in Baltic, Russian, Mediterranean and 
Caribbean markets (Israel 1989: 43-66). Domination of these trades required more than entrepot 
storage space; it also depended on the growing textile industry mentioned above. As the leading 
edge of commercial expansion shifted to the colonial and rich trades, the merchants engaged in 
colonial trade, p'roclaiming the need for the state to help merchants secure wider opportunities in 
the Indies, swept into power in Amsterdam in 1601 (Elias 1923: 44-6). Heading the group were 
the precompqy directors, Reynier Pauw and Gerr$ Bicker, soon to be founding directors of the 
East Indies Company. 
Thus the position of merchants within the governing coalition, particularly the long- 
distance merchants of the colonial'and rich trades, was greatly strengthened. Politico-economic 
development before the Revolt, and then the course of the Revolt itself, propelled Holland and 
Zeeland merchants to the forefront of the Dutch elite and consolidated ai.evo1utiona.y coalition 
which bound to the merchants disaffected nobles, pirates, manufacturers, burghers and anti- 
Spanish Calvinist preachers. It  was this motley group -- dubbed "Hogglanders", "Butterboxes", 
and "Sovereign Lords Millers and Cheeseheads" by their envious English rivals -- that struggled to 
carve out the outlines of a new state. 
The state-builders pursued two strategies in these formative and combative years. In the 
earliest phase, punctuated by military threats to the integrity of the United Provinces themselves, 
the States-General appointed foreign quasi-monarchical protectors chosen on the basis of Dutch ' 
alliances with France and England, respectively. This first, weak patrimonial absolutist, strategy 
involved drafting a foreign substitute for the now defunct Habsburg monarch. The second phase, 
*..- 
which was rational-legal bureaucratic in thrust, saw a pioneering effort to build an integrated 
central state, based on an  attempt to eliminate venal office-holding and to transform the Council of 
State van State) into the nucleus of a national a d r n i n i s t r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Roth strategies foundered 
on the rocks of urban and provincial opposition, and organized merchant class resistance 
articulated via patrimonial state bodies. In particular, the mercantile elites of the States of 
Holland . ., refused to relinquish control over maritime policy or the naval dominance they had 
established in Low Countries waters.26 The regents consistently resisted any perceived erosion of 
their particularistic powers and privileges. They ousted the foreign protectors, and their organ, the 
States-General, pruned the powers of the Council in 1588, restricting it to implementing the 
State's directives. The States-General declared itself in 1590 "the sovereign institution of the 
25 The regents in the Holland States banned venality of ofice in 1579. No general law against 
office sales was enacted during the Dutch ancien regime, due to provincial sovereignty. See Swart 
(1949: 68-78). Elsewhere I discuss in detail these state-building strategies and the limits placed 
' 
upon them by patrimonial structures. See Adams (1990). 
26 They went so far as  to suborn the Council of State in order to block government investigations 
of illegal collaboration in smuggling and customs fraud subsisting between the Amsterdam 
admiralty and leading merchants. (Vlekke 1945: 147, 153; Elias 1963: xl-xli) Their objections 
were focussed further by the presence of a formal representative of England on the Council, 
raising doubts and complaints about its independent sovereign status. 
<, 
country," with "no overlord except the deputie's OF the pro;incial estates them~elves."~ The ' 
founding Union of Utrecht, which did not establish common central institutions, became the 
-. 4 . 
fallback basis, and the closest thing to a constitution, of the estatist state. 
As R. R. Palmer remarked, the intricacies of the independent Dutch state "baffle brief 
. 
description" (19591: 38). We need only review the most important features here,'those that bear 
on the story being told. The Union reserved soverdignty to the provincial assemblies, and 
empowered the States-General to enact only what had been previously agreed up in those bodies. 
The provincial States were to agree unanimously in the big decisions on war, peace, and taxes 
affecting the whole Union. And the provincial States were in turn largely delegates of the fifty- 
eight voting Cstemhebbende) towns.28 Thus about fifteen hundred regents -- town councillors and 
magistrates;..together. with the members of the-upper.juclicia1 and-governmental colleges and high 
.-: . administrative officials .-:.were:reaffirmedias the .ruling .elite (Fockema -Andreae 19 69: 36-9; 
Schoffer 1988). 
.Notsthat the state worked:perfectly, even.from the start. At times of national crisis, when 
its centrifugal-tendencies were most apparent, the regents fell back on the indigenous Stadholders 
appointed by each province (traditionally but not necessarily, the Prince of Orange), whose powers 
they had sharply circumscribed but not eliminated. Some of the stadholders themselves sought to 
lay c1airn.h the monarchical prerogatives vacated by the Habsburgs but still close to the hearts of 
many of the populace. The Princes of Orange had traditional prestige, dynastic connections, 
military duties as the head of the army, and a say over the composition of some provincial 
27 Although struggles between the States and the Council continued into the early seventeenth 
century, the Council lacked institutional capacities to conduct a national policy, or to enforce 
sovereign directives on recalcitrant provinces, towns, or corporations. (Fockema Andreae 1969; 
Elias 1923: 30) 
28 In Holland the towns held eighteen out of nineteen votes. In Zeeland only one noble voted, the 
Prince of Orange. In the north-east, States membership derived from the ownership of areas 
where franchise-holding farms had stood, but the city oligarchy controlled participation. In 
Overijssel, the three towns had three votes to the nobility's one. In Groningen, the city and 
nobility had one vote each. In Friesland the towns had only one vote out of four. For an English- 
language resume of the mechanics of urban voting prerogatives, see Vlekke (1945: 162-64). 
assemblies via power over town government elections. Even when the regents governed alone 
.. . during the stadholderless eras (self-servingly dubbed the Eras of True Freedom, or Ware Vrijheid, 
their politico-economic position and legitimacy was linked to the stadholderate a s  one of the few 
symbols of national unity. Yet the Stadholders were not successful in claiming sovereign status 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Simon Schama puts it: "In wartime, the 
Stadholder existed in an uneasy czpacity, part warlord, part commissioned officer; in peacetime 
his role was even more presidential-patriarchal, rather than royal-governmental" (198 7: 6 7). 29 
The fact of the power of the Holland and Amsterdam regents over the other provinces and 
the stadholderate was consistently evident, exercized via multiple mechanisms. First, the 
merchant-regents established ideological hegemony. "It is true that the State is seen as  the organ 
- ,. 
of one particular group, destined to create favorable conditions for the latter's maximum 
expansion," writes Gramsci. "But the development and expansion of the particular group are 
conceived of, and presented, as  being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of 
all the "national" energies" (Gramsci 1971: 182). In just this sense, the merchant-regents 
t a 
successfully campaigned for support from or acquiescence by other provinces and groups on the 
basis of the positive impact of their politico-economic projects on the Netherlands a s  a whole (see .. - 
Schoffer 1964: 64-98).30 
i 
Second, in the key policy areas of international commercial and colonial politics, the power 
of the Amsterdam and Holland regents was rapidly configured into political structures themselves, 
and ideological power was married to institutional clout. The Holland States and Amsterdam town 
council appointed and provided the key personnel in matters of foreign policy, tax collection and 
the navy. The Grand Pensionary of Holland usurped the place of the States-General's Griffier and 
29 The best brief English-language account of the relationship between the regents and 
stadholders is Rowen (1988). Note that the provincial States were not legally bound to appoint the 
same individual to each provincial stadholderate until 1747. 
30 I t  seems to me symptomatic that the illustrious butch jurist Grotius authored both the 
international maritime doctrine of "Mare Liberum" and a domestic political theory that enabled 
the collective rule of the regents and provincial estates over their would-be sovereign monarchs. 
served as  a kind of ~ r i m & ' ~ i h i s t e r ,  formulating and conducting foreign pblicy initiatives. Holland 
appointed and paid almost all diplomats; Amsterdam itself controlled (appointed and paid) many 
ambassadors, including those for Paris, the Scandinavian countries, and the Hanseatic cities. 
These diplomats sought guidance from their provincial and town authorities as well a s  the States- 
General (Boogman 1979: 396-7). Eventually Holland also appointed and dominated three of the 
five naval admiralties, charged with collecting the Comoy and License monies (taxes on shipping) 
that maintained the navy -- a fact which would turn out to be crucial in sealing the province's, and 
Amsterdam's, dominant position. 
Finally, if push came to shove, and other cities, provinces or the Stadholder resisted more 
tactful !eadership, the Holland regents had (and used) what amounted to a fiscal veto over policy 
implementation;-Holland.contributed,at least 59% (acd often up to-66% if not more) of the siate's 
. annual .budget, and Amsterdam a significant .portion .of ~ol land 's .  Of ,this;:the-regent -elite paid 
_a substantial share. In 1600, about half of the Amsterdam regents were large scale merchants 
,(Burke 1974:. 43,-58).. The merchant-regents2fiscal resources helped-keep the unwieldy ship of 
state afloat, and they laid heavy hands on the .tiller.32 These mechanisms -- institutional, 
ideological, and fiscal--- awarded merchant capitalists, especially those or" Amsterdam, 
extraordinary say in formulating commercial/colonial, and indeed general, state policy goals. 
Patrimonialism. Charte red C w a n i e s .  and the R ise of the Colonial I nterest 
The fledgling state, committed to promoting international commercial interests, faced its 
first significant challenge when the growing competition among precompanies, which was raising 
31 Estimates of Amsterdam's share differ fairly widely, however, from about 15% to 50%. For a 
recent discussion of this issue, see 't Hart (1989). 
32 Hence the structure and composition of the Amsterdam gqvernment was crucial. The thirty-. 
six members of the town council ( v r o e d s c ~ ,  propertied men chosen for life by cooptation, 
supplied a list of regents from which the four mayors were elected annually, as well as  
participating in the election of'the aldermen (sche~,enen) responsible for making laws. The council 
also advised the mayors, who headed the council, supervised religious and poor relief institutions, 
oversaw taxation and the city's financial institutions, the civil militia and army garrisons, .and 
zppointed representatives to the Council of State and the Admiralties. See Porta (1973: 23-5). 
spice prices in Asia and lowering selling prices in the Netherlands, endangered the profits of the 
precompanies themselves. The alliance between the Amsterdam regents and the Holland Grand 
Pensionary Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, who encouraged and mediated negotiations among those 
concerned, persuaded other merchants to put aside their fears of Amsterdam's dominance and to 
pool their efforts, and the state chartered the East Indies Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie, or VOC) in 1 6 0 2 . ~ ~  The charter awarded the VOC a 21-year monopoly on trade east 
of the Cape of Good Hope. The tripartite monopoly covered shipping, objects of trade and their sale 
in the Netherlands. The charter also delegated sovereign rights to the company, while rendering it 
dependent on the state for the recognition and renewal of its monopoly privileges and territorial 
claims, and for the domestic support of its monopoly. The East Indies Company was a patrimonial 
state creation, and a merged state-merchant partnership from the start. 
The VOC was both innovative and traditional. I t  was one of the first examples of a limited 
liabiliby company, pioneering a concept of permanent capital and a partial distinction between 
company and individual assets.34 As such, it was able to attract a strikingly broad range of 
investors, and to accumulate an unprecedented initial capital, which reached the then huge sum of 
6,424,588 guilders 0. However, it was representative of the Dutch economic elite, both in class 
and regional terms. Most initial shareholders were large-scale wholesale merchants; they also 
invested proportionately the most money (Van Dillen 1958: 45-9). Amsterdam investors supplied 
57% of the initial capital.35 As they continued to buy up smaller shareholders, the number of 
shareholders in the Amsterdam chamber shrank from 1143 in 1602 to 830 in 1612 0. The 
first directors were also merchants. Thirty-six men served as  directors of the Amsterdam chamber 
33 The foregoing is drawn from Gaastra (1982: 9-11) and Prakash (1987: 185-6). A reproduction 
of the charter can be found in Cau (1658 i: 530fTJ. 
34 The major improvements over the precompanies were that shareholders contributed to the 
company itself, not to individual directors; that they contributed for a period of ten years, not one 
voyage; and that directors were not personally responsible for company debts, while shareholders 
were responsible only for up to the amount of their investment. See Van Dillen (1958: 20-34). 
35 Amsterdam merchants furnished 1.7 million fl. in 1602 alone, enticed by prospects like one 
pre-company's 400-500% profit on a single fleet. (Boxer 1965: 25; Gaastra 1982: 21-6) 
* .  . 
in the 1602-17 peribd. Of those on whom I hive data, twenty-four were large-scale wholesale 
merchants and one was an admiral (Adams 1990: Appendix One). 
The corporation was also created in the image of the estatiit itate. The iharter distributed 
policy-making and operations across six chambers (kamers) and a regionally balanced court of 
. , 
directors. Each chamber was to build and furnish its own ships and recruit its own sailors, while 
return cargos and profits were to be proportionally redistributed. Eight of the central court of 
seventeen directors, the Gentlemen XVII (Heren XVII), came from Amsterdam, four from 
Middelburg, one each from the four small chambers, and seventeenth was be elected either 
from Middelburg or one of the small chambers.36 Vacancies among the directors were to be filled 
by cooption from shortlists of large shareholders given by the chamber directors in question to the 
magistrate of the.relevant town, a mechanism that promised even closer ties hetween company 
I . and-urban elites (Gaastra 1982: 17-21). These-ties were close fromkhe:beginning: of the thirty-six 
initial directors of the Amsterdam chamber, a t  least ten can definitely be said to have held city 
office, .and :a number$of themswere .opinion!leaders and key-political*players*in the town council. 
Profits and power were the watchwords of the company, as  they were for all patrimonial 
corporations. Grand Pensionary van Oldenbarnevelt asserted in 1602 that a company was 
necessary "for damaging the enemy and for security of the fatherland".37 The VOC was 
successful from the outset. Mounting an offensive against the Iberian empire in the East Indies, 
with a view to making money and cutting the costs of war to the States-General, the VOC made 
rapid inroads in the spice islands, the South Moluccas and Banda Islands, the source of the world's . 
cloves and nutmeg, forcing the Portuguese off Amboina in the Moluccas in 1605 and securing a 
foothold in Ternate and Tidore. Some merchant investors resisted this bellicose turn of events 
36 The initial investments of the chambers were: Amsterdam, 3,679,915 fl.; Middelturg 
(Zeeland), 1,300,405; Delft, 469,400; Rotterdam, 173,000; Hoorn, 266,868; Enkhuizen, 540,000 
(Gaastra 1982: 22). 
37 Quoted in Boxer (1979: 1). The founding of the VOC was an extension of the policy by which 
the States of Holland and many towns gave the precompanies arms and exempted them from 
duties. Unlike the VOC, however, the precompanies neither had sovereign rights nor made claims 
to sovereignty. 
(Van Dillen 1958: 19). In 1608, and again in 16 13, some protested and withdrew from the 
company, but they had no discernable impact on policy. The Dutch route to mercantile riches was 
not the route of free trade, ggxg Wallerstein. Rather, it was an  explicitly coercive politico-economic 
project. The VOCYs commercial and military success transformed the international balance of 
power, and helped to hurry Spain to the negotiating table, where Dutch colonial projects had 
suddenly become bargaining chips. 
At this stage, the accumulation strategies of Dutch carrying traders and colonial 
merchants were contradictory, and they voiced opposed interests in the outcome of the 
negotiations with Spain. The carrying traders wanted peace, and were willing to trade away the 
s- 
possibility of colonial gains to get it. The colonial interest strongly opposed the Grand Pensionary's 
+. &-- >.%; , 
proposal that the VOC be liquidated and plans for a West Indies Company scrapped in exchange 
&$ . - < for Spanish recognition of Dutch independence. The most vociferous opposition emanated from the 
Amsterdam town council, which argued that peace would damage trade and privateering in the 
fl 
-. *- 
Indies, and that the West Indies Company (backed by the council since 1606) would never be 
e i% 
realized (Elias 1963 i: xlix; Hoboken 1960: 48). Despite their opposition, and that of the 
"s; 
:. Staclholder and the hard-line Calvinist clergy, the Twelve Year Truce was signed in 1609. The 
j "; 
.. . majority of the representatives to the Holland States had come to support the Grand Pensionary 
and an  end to the hostilities. The States of the land provinces had also supported peace, hoping for 
lower taxes. The Truce specified that Spain recognized the independence of the United Provinces 
and that both would keep their Indies possessions.38 
The Truce did benefit European carrying traders, shipbuilders,and sailors39, but it could 
not produce a permanent peace because of domestic opposition. The VOCYs success continued to 
38 Parker neatly sums up the situation from Spain's point of view: "Spain was not prepared to 
abandon for ever her monopoly status in the New World, but neither was she prepared to continue 
fighting in the Netherlands for the sake of the Portuguese Indies" (1979: 54-55). 
39 Danish Sound toll data show that the Dutch position in the Baltic improved tr 'emend~usl~: the 
Dutch share of total ships entering the Baltic rose from 60% to over 70% in 1609-20, a level that 
was never reached again (Den Haan 1977: 141, 197-99; see also Christensen 1941). The Dutch 
. . 
strengthen th i  hand'of the colonial t r idirs  and the Amsterdam vriedsch;rp.'a& their opposition 
ultimately carried the day. The Heren XVII propagandized against the Truce a t  home, actively 
petitioning the s tates-~oneral ,  provincial States, and key town counc'ils, while "their men in the 
Indies" worked to seize a s  much territory "as possible and to monopolize the world spice trade 
(Furber 1976: 34; 1srae1' 1982: 13-5, 36). During the Truce, the VOC defiantly expanded its 
operztions in Asia. From 1602-10, 76 ships carrying 8,500 men were sent to Asia; from 1611-20, 
117 ships and 19,000 men.40 Batavia (Jakarta) was designated as  the Indies entrepot and 
headquarters in l B l l  and its Governor-General was statibned there. Since cocton cloth was the 
commodity most in demand in the Indonesian spice-producing areas, and access to a stable supply 
would reduce the need for specie, the VOC moved in on the trade in cotton cloth emanating from 
. . ..; :the scuth-east .Indian coast, whel-e:it,;soon .supplant~d.:.t.l~e~Portuguese in:,relations with indigenous 
Ttraders~and.producers-(Raychaudhuri -1962). .But the Heren XVII.were forced to hold back on their 
ambitious-plans for expansion in the Chinese silk and Ceylon cinnamon trades, and the ruling 
. ..- .., faction :blamed.Oldenbarnevelt and.the Truce (Eliasi 1923: 39-44). ,The colonia1:interest and 
~Amsterdam's efforts to.overturn it., joined by Leiden and other manufacturing towns, as  well as  
. inland towns in Holland and Zeeland, succeeded in reversing the policy.41 The colonial interest 
was instrumental in the struggles that led to Oldenbarnevelt's execution in 1618 and the renewal 
of war with  ber ria.^^ 
The issue was net, it should be emphasized, a lack of state support for long-distance and 
colonial power and pr6fit. In fact, the States-General had supported the VOC against its own 
part of the Mediterranean carrying trade between Spain and Italy, and of the rich Levant trades, 
also climbed steeply (Israel 1989). 
40 See Bruijn et al. (1987) for more complete figures on VOC tonnages and cargoes. The numbers 
of ships are still relatively small, but the values of the cargoes were disproportionat;ely high. 
41 These towns were now bypassed by goods shipped directly from the Baltic and ~ r a n c e  instead 
of via their waterways. While the land provinces did not get higher taxes, they did not get tax cuts 
either. Israel provides a brilliant historical reconstruction of the economic impact of the Truce 
(1989: 86-101). 
42 For a concise ~n~l i sh- language  history of this period, see Kossmann (1970: 371-34). ~ o s s e  
(1970: 176-81) summarizes the religious dimensions. 
share-holders and its charter a t  a critical juncture in 1612, enabling the Company to hold off on 
paying dividends and to begin accumulating a permanent capital. In that same year, the States- 
General had contributed toward building a fortified trading post on the Gold Coast of ~ f r i c a . ~ ~  
The issue was rather that the merchants concerned considered the level of support inadequate, 
and the structure of the Dutch state enabled them to act on their perceived interests. 
The accession of the colonial interest to power in the States-General and the resumption of 
the war against Iberia opened the way for an all-out combative colonial strategy in Asia and the 
Americas. The Heren XVII promoted the imperialist visionary Jan  Pieterszoon Coen to Governor- 
General (16 19-23, 162 7-29). Coen's goals, expanding the so-called "country" (intra-Asian) trade in 
C?- . - order to accumulate a permanent Asian capital, and seizing the world spice monopoly, were 
?-a 
g2::. 
realized in the seventeenth century. Coen moved aggressively and decisively against indigenous 
5i& 
and European competitors. The English in particular, he insisted in 1620, had no right to a single 
r -- "grain of sand (niet een sandeken) in the Mollucas, Amboina or ~ a n d a . " ~ ~  With the aim of 
+z?& - 
solidifying the Dutch monopoly, he instigated severely repressive policies against the indigenous 
.* Nu 
population of the Spice Islands, culminating in the selective extermination and enslavement of the 
-? + 
"2 - r 
Bandanese people.45 Coen's projects were in a real sense made possible by the dispersed 
sovereignty inherent in patrimonial political structures, which effectively interposed layers of 
"plausible deniability" between what he was doing and what the States-General and even the 
Heren XVII had to acknowledge, or could always control. Even the English Ambassador Ralph 
Winwood acknowledged that the VOC "...is a body by themselves, powerfull and mighty in this 
43 Van den Boogaart 1982: 115; Elias 1923: 39-44. Extracts from resolutions of the States 
General, in ARA 1.01.07 #1235, #1237, #1244, also testify to state support for the company's 
general goals. 
44 The unabashed "grain of sand" letter of May 11, 1620 can be found in the collected writings, 
volume 1, edited by Colenbrander (1919: 543-57, especially p. 544). 
45 Coen's third goal, bringing out Dutch settlers to be supported with slave labor if necessary, 
was not broadly implemented ia the early modern period. See his plea to the Heren XVII for 
young Dutch women w e e  rnevdwxd to populate the colony, also in the letter of May 11, 1620 
(Colenbrander 19 19: 555). 
. . 
State, and &ill not aik*owliges the authogity ofthe States generally more than shall be for their 
private profits." (letter to Count of Salisbury, 31 January110 February 1612, collected in Clark 
and Eysinga 1940 i: 51-2).~6 
Meanwhile the West Indies Company was chartered in 1621, and granted a monopoly on 
trade, transport and product sales in the Americas and. wes t  Africa and sovereign ;ights to make 
treaties with non-European rulers for twenty-four years. It was conceived as  a politico-economic 
weapon aimed a t  r~e r i a ,  perhaps even more than the VUC a t  its founding, with closer ties to the 
States-General, which invested in it and named a representative to the Board of Directors, and a 
charter which explicitly cited piracy as  a company mission. Its five-chambered organization and 
directorate of Nineteen Gentlemen Weren XIX) closely resembled the VOC's, and were also 
. dominated by Amsterdam, although to a lesser extent than the ~ 0 ~ ' s . ~ ~ .  The WIC mounted a 
,. . . - . :;.;series of .ambitious..attempts._to link the.rAmericas;..West.Africa nd the.Nether1ands in a colonial 
trading network. It  survived mainly by privateering, peaking as a pirate enterprise in 1628-9 with - .the dramatic-capture of Spain'sannual Mexican silver fleet .(an.exploit still celebrated in Dutch 
children's songs). The company,was.most successful in its post-1637 phase,-in which captured 
- territory and,sugar plantations in Brazil were linked with sugar markets in the United Provinces 
and an expanded West African slave trade in the first of the infamous Atlantic triangular trades 
0.In 1640, 120 of the formerly Portuguese sugar plantations were again 
producing sugar, this time for the Dutch. Renewed productivity was built on the backs of over 
46 For Coen's outrage a t  and ultimately successful oppor Ation to the Heren XVII's efforts to 
conclude a truce with the English East India Company, see his.letter in Colenbrander (1919: 543- 
4). 
47 The 83 leading shareholders of the Amsterdam chamber invested over one million guilders, 113 
of'the city's total, but a high proportion of investment in that chamber came from outside the city, 
compared to the VOC. For the founding of the WIC, see Menkman (1947: 42-6), Goslinga (1971: 
90-3), and Van Dillen (1970: 146-9). 
23,000 slaves shipped from Elmina and Sao Paolo (in Angola) to Brazil between 1636 and 
1 6 4 5 . ~ ~  
Intercomorate Struggle and Patrimonial Elite Division 
The capacity of patrimonial states to formulate and execute decisions rested on the 
organization and resources of corporate groups (and on the instruments that the state had to 
regulate their activities), as well as  on the state's "own" institutions. The relationship between 
states and chartered mercantile and colonial companies was especially important in this context. 
When the companies were successful, as the VOC in particular was, they established a degree of 
political autonomy, and the relationship between them and their home states became complex and 
i T..-- contested. "It is surely true to say that the Dutch East Indies Company is not only a trading 
Gh? 
-.,- company but also a state," remarked the Dutch statesman and company director Coenraad van 
'I3+' 
Beuningen in about 1684, aptly capturing the corporation's sovereign power as  well as its fused 
li" 
.*.. politico-economic character. Seen from the perspective of rulers, the structure of patrimonial rule 
1 tzy 
-*? 
therefore entailed a worrisome degree of insubordination. Conversely, from the perspective of 
11. 
. , +.- merchants - - and investors, it made for operational unpredictability. The companies' right to operate 
was contingent on the state's renewal of company charters, and that renewal was never 
guaranteed. Although these tensions diminished when the monarch was subordinated to the 
estates, and merchants or manufacturers controlled the levers of estatist rule, a s  in the 
Netherlands, the problem never vanished. 
Here again, the world-system concept of states in global interrelationship fails to grasp the 
genuine impact of patrimonial corporations and segmented sovereignty on the developing system, 
and on the states that were evolving within it. Chartered companies, like other powerful corporate 
48 For this phase of WIC history, see Emmer (1972), Van den Boogaart (1982: 116-27), and Van 
Dillen (1970: 153-7, 160-1). Postma's (1990) is the most thorough analysis of the Dutch slave 
trade. Hal1 (1991) analyzes colonial Brazilian agriculture as  a patrimonial political economy, from 
a neo-Weberian perspective critical of world-systems theory. Also relevant is Stern's opening salvo 
in his debate with Wallerstein, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective 
of Latin America and the Caribbean" (1988). 
bodies joined towns, provinces, and other'corporations in jockeying for position andstruggling to 
define themselves politically within in emergent strictured totality, the interstate ~ ~ s t , e m . ~ g  
Whereas world systems theorists consis&ntly stress'the necessary functionality of interstate 
competition for the preservation of the world system (although they have so far failed to specify 
the mechanisms that guarantee that state of affairs), I am emphasizing the social-structural 
contradictions and contestation that take place at9the macro-institutional level.50 We can expect 
the presence of multiple centers of sovereignty only partially regulated by overarching norms or a 
central power to introduce distinctive pressures, both for the Netherlands and for the world- 
system as'a whole. We can also expect that, for a iatiimonial politico-economic system to be 
successfu! in the long run (and in the limit case hegemonic), a state's spinoff corporations and 
, :companies have. to work-in tandem with-0ne:another and with their home state, as  well as being 
.effective%againstrother:states and .their corporations. This is atdifficult equilibrium to .achieve. My 
analysis in this section thus focuses on intercorporate interact;ons, which were only gradually 
. organized .and. subsumed under state-to-state,-networks, -and which were a n  integral feature of the 
precarious, and evanescent, structural balance underpinning Dutch hegemony. 
The pressures of war weighted the scales against the West Indies Company. As the 
contest with Spaili dragged on, it became harder for carrying traders to obtain salt for fish 
preservation and wool for the textile industry. Naval attacks and privateering in the Baltic 
affected the availability of the naval supplies that advantaged Dutch shipbuilders, and thus freight 
rates. The war also hurt merchants engaged in the essential trade in grain (Christensen 1941: 
377-8; Den Haan 1977: 150). As early as  the 1633 negotiations, the Amsterdam town council 
49 Both Giddens (1986: 301). and Tilly (1990) note that corporate bodies made sovereign claims in 
early modern Europe. In my view, however, they greatly underrate the historical impact of that 
fact. 
50 For example, Hopkins writes of the system: "What marks it is this: the alignments or sides are 
so formed on each occasion ("balance of power") as to reproduce, as  the outcome of conflict, the 
necessary condition for the state-system to continue to operate, namely, a n  array of interrelated 
states no one of which can mobilize the force and allies needed to subjugate all the others (thus 
preserving the development of the modern world as  a world-economy by blocking its conversion 
into a world-empire)" (Hopkins 1982: 24-5). 
began instructing its deputies in the Holland States to agree to Dutch withdrawal from Brazil. 
Amsterdam merchants became increasingly vociferous in the cause of the carrying trade. One 
hundred fifty-nine of the city's largescale traders lodged a protest in the States-General in 1641 
. -. 
regarding the diversion of funds away from the defense of European trade, and they called loudly 
for free -- k non-company -- trade in the West Indies. 
Why did the Amsterdam city council, once the staunchest promoter, lose its enthusiasm for 
the West Indies Company? Part  of the answer lies in the faction that was uppermost in the 
vroedschap: the Bicker family and its clients, which blended European carrying trade interests 
with an orientation to East Indies expansion. They came to the fore in the late 1620s, and ruled 
"not only the seas and the Amsterdam exchange but also the Town Hall" (Roorda 1964: 124) for a 
. *  .. quarter century thereafter via patronage and marital alliances, which embraced other influential 
..... merchant-regent families. The mercantile holdings of the Bickers themselves spanned the globe, 
consolidating a new level of unity of merchant capital, finance and government in Amsterdam. 
. . Gerrit, . . a town councillor from 1590 until his death in 1604, served many local governmental 
functions. He was a founder of the precompany The Far Lands Company and a founding investor 
i 
in the I,. VOC, and took part in a 1597 trading effort to America and Peru and one to Northern 
Russia. His sons continued the tradition of far-flung involvements. Andries, yroedscha member 
from 1622 to his death in 1652, was many times Amsterdam mayor, overseer of the Wisselbank, 
representative to the Admiralty and States-General, Ambassador a t  various times to the Swedish, 
Polish and Brandenburg courts, as well as a trader in spices and Russian furs. His brother Jacob - 
was a VOC director f r ~ m  1610 to 1641, while Andries himself served from 1641 to 1652. The 
third son Jan  was a well-known merchant involved in Italian and Levant trades and ship-building. 
The Bicker clan had also been an early supporter of the WIC, and Gerrit's fourth son, Cornelis, 
was appointed a director in 1622. In 1629, however, the Bickers sold their shares, disengaged 
themselves from the company, and began competing against it in Brazil-based commerce. Thus 
the Amsterdam city council's connection with the WIC was attenuated after 1630, and the council 
- *  - 
strongly favored free trade b Brazil, including the openingof the lucrative slave trade, for all 
Dutch  merchant^.^ 
The &cumulation strategies of the WIC were increasingly diverging frdm those of the 
Amsterdam carrying traders akd West &dies interlopers; as  expressed by delegations fromthese 
groups and the .~msterdam city council. Now the ~ a s t  Indies Company turned against the WIC as  
well. There had been prior strains and competition for military resources between the companies. 
To give just'one serious example: the WIC lost Bahia, the capital of Brazil, to the Spanish, only a 
year after having captured it in 1624, because WIC naval reinforcements were diverted by the 
States-Gerieral to blockade the Iberian coast and to protect VOC shipping (Goslinga 1971: 148- 
5%). But now the divergence was starker. The VOC, which was shipping over a million pounds a 
year of Chinese sugar from its base in Formosa (Taiwan) by the--1630~~ faced-competition'from 
:,rising sugar production in-Dutch-Brazil. By~the arly 1640s,.this competition wasrcutting into the 
VOC's trade (which surged again after the_WICYs ouster) (Harrison 1970: 659). The Heren XVII 
. "+:had also.stopped,opposing.pesrce with Spainpnow .that%they were~:sufficiently.established in the 
East Indies to set their own conditions for compliance.52 Finally, the VOC was.faced with a 
-proposal of merger raised by the.WIC and supported by elements of the States-General -- which 
the company disliked and eventually eluded. It was in this context that the Heren XVII made their 
famous and characteristically patrimonial remark, or threat, that the East Indies belonged to the 
Long ago, Boxer (1957: 255-58), seconded by Goslinga (197 1: 297-89), noted that the.Bickers7 
actions undercut Amsterdam's support for the.,WIC.  his is not to.say,.of course, that all 
. . , Amsterdam merchants followed the Bickers' lead and summarily abandoned the company; some 
Amsterdam merchants actually increased their investments at that time. My point is rather that 
the Bicker family's and Amsterdam v r o e d s u s  change of line influenced the state's overall 
support for the WIC's commercial system. 
. . 
52 The Heren XVII'S conditions advised the States-General, in 1644 and 1645, that if peace were 
to be made, Spain had to agree not to extend its forts and trade beyond current limits or to take 
any Portuguese possessions (Israel 1982: 334-6). 
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VOC, not to the States-General, and could be sold for profit to the Spanish or to any other enemy 
of the state.53 
The drop that made the bucket overflow (to employ a well-worn Dutch metaphor) was a 
rebellion by Portuguese colonists in Brazil. The colonists protested the monopoly prices of imported 
European goods and slaves, and the falling prices of their own sugar and dyewood exports in 
Europe, by rising up against the company's temporarily reduced forces and driving the WIC out of 
the capital in 1645. One can speculate, in the grounded "historical counterfactual" vein, that had 
the Heren XM's efforts to encourage colonization paid off, or had company policies vis-a-vis. the 
percentage of surplus that was to remain in the sphere of production been less grudging, tensions 
within the ~rahi l ian colonial elite would have been eased, and the revolt might have been defused 
or defeated.54 I t  was not, however, and the WIC was forced to seek state subsidies and military 
support to regain its prize. 
At this juncture the shift of Amsterdam mercantile elite support away from company 
organization in the Atlantic zone proved critical for the fate of the WIC. The Amsterdam 
\.roedschaD and VOC directorate, extensively overlapping categories to be sure, sabotaged the 
WIC. . . For a decade after 1645, I believe, the company could have won back Brazil if it had 
received a modicum of the economic and military support that the state was capable of providing. 
Portugal was a puny sea power compared to the United Provinces, and the Portuguese state was 
divided over what tack to take with the colonists (Prestage 1925: 205; Van de Haar 1961). The 
WIC was thwarted not so much by the rebellion as  by the Amsterdam's and the VOC's refusal to 
provide the resources to counter it. The company did not receive the subsidy and armed support 
53 The VOC7s charter had expired in 1643, and renewal was held up by the WIC's efforts to 
secure its position by fusing with the VOC, as  well as by the demands of several towns that they 
be allowed their own chambers in the company. The VOC agreed to admit representatives from 
these towns to existing chambers, but staunchly opposed the merger. (Van Rees 1868: 209-10; 
Van Dam 1927 [I7011 i: 43-72; Van Dillen 1970: 127) For the WIC directors' merger proposal, 
see the documents in ARA 1.04.02 #4652. 
54 From 1642, the WIC tried to foster Dutch emigration, but the number of Dutch agricultural 
settlers remained only a few hundred. Most of the 3000 in 1642 were merchants and officials. 
(Van den Boogaart 1982: 123-4) 
voted by th i  States-Geneial because of ~nisterd&'s,  fLnd Holland's, bpposition (Van Dillen 1970: 
157; Israel 1982: 37 1-3). The VOC administered the CQUJI de mace in 1653 by refusing an offer 
. . 
from the Portuguese, backed by the' WIC and the Dutch s tates-~eneral  itself, to exchange some 
.. . 
East Indies conquests of Portuguese possessions for the WICYs Brazilian cliirns (pre;tage 1926: 
214-5). Thus'the Portuguese were able to oust the WIC from its last outposts in Brazil'in January 
1654. After that date the WIC was neither an effective mercantile enterprise nor an  instrument of 
war (Van den Boogaart 1982: 1 3 4 - 4 4 ) . ~ ~  
Historians have debabd whether or not the absolute burden of debt'made it impossible for 
the Dutch state to intervene in favor of either the WIC dr of a more broadly interpreted ~ u t c l i  
Brazil. I t  is true that war costs were high.56 Yet in the 1660s the state had no difficulty finding 
z more subs~ribers~for the loans-it-sought.:It-should also-be pointed out that-the ~4msterdam town 
,:- ~,council:armed.. a fleet of 160 warships :with: funds- from -the .Stock .Exchange,, directed by the city 
regents, and used it in the preliminaries to the first Anglo-Dutch ~ g r  in 1652. The coGncil was 
- ;also able ito intervene aggressively in ,the .war-between :Denmark ,and Sweden (1656-9) to protect 
I 
.its northern trade; and to mount an extensive expedition to the, west coast of Africa in 1664, 
precipitating the second Anglo-Dutch War (Elias 1923: 1 3 9 ) . ~ ~  
I t  is therefore more reasonable to draw the "historical counterfactual" conclusion that the 
Amsterdam merchant-regent elite was capable of mounting a defense of the WIC and Dutch 
Brazil, but, chose not to, in'the face of the more traditional mercantile, and to it more compelling, 
interests of the European carrying trade and East Indies Company. The VOC in particular was 
55 The Dutch Republic renounced its cla'im to Brazil a t  the conclusion of the war with Portugal in 
1661. 
As Marjolein 't Hart (1993) notes, the companies had been a key factor in driving up the 
central public debt from 4.9 million fl. in 1617 to 13.2 million fl. in 1648, and Holland's more 
important provincial debt from 1.5 million fl. in 1621 to the startling figure of 130-140 million fl. 
in 1650. 'T Hart's book, explicitly inspired by Tilly's (1990) theoretical stance, deals with the 
important relationship between war and the early seventeenth century Dutch fiscal system. 
57 In which war, it should be noted, the VOC played its part. See the documents in ARA 1.04.02 
#4723 regarding the contemporaneous squabbles between the VOC and the English East India 
Company. 
able to make that decision stick because the States-General lacked any sovereign mechanism by 
which i t  could enforce immediate compliance on its patrimonial corporations. If the pressures of 
interstate war and colonial rebellion weighted the scales against the.WIC, it was Amsterdam and 
the VOC that tipped the balance. 
Thus the patrimonial statelcorporate system engendered inter-corporate struggles that 
caused the first cracks to appezr in the international commercial system organized around the 
Netherlands as  active entrepot trader. Furthermore, the patrimonial statel corporate configuration 
restructured the linkages between overseas trade and colonial production in the Atlantic territories 
-- specificaliy plantation agriculture based on slavery -- in ways which affected the Netherlands' 
L - ability to sustain that trading system, and hence the hegemonic moment. The loss of Brazil 
,;s c17 deprived the Dutch of a settler plantation agricultural zone that could match the eventual 
.-. . 
r.?<Gk 
production levels of the English and French possessions and serve a s  a politically secure fallback 
home market, thus cushioning economic reverses for Dutch merchants when other metropolitan 
G:; countries began to enforce increasingly protectionist measures. The comparatively poor economic 
-5%. 
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performance, and eventual failure, of their truncated plantation holdings undercut the Dutch share 
c5tAL in the Atlantic multilateral trade.58 Perhaps even more consequential for future domestic politico- 
economic development, the ties between planters and colonial-interloping and other independent 
traders, which had grown up in Brazil within the shell of the West Indies Company, were 
permanently disrupted. In an actually-existing "historical counterfactual" instance, analogous 
linkages would become a key basis for English commercial expansion in the Atlantic zone.59 
58 For the Dutch, see Emmer (1982: 150-5). Postma (1990: Chapter Twelve) reviews the final 
years of the Dutch slave trade. For the contemporaneous expansion of French colonial trade, see 
Butel (1990) and Boulle (1972: 7 1-4). Wilson (1965: 264, 27 1-2) discusses the slippage of the 
Netherlands' relative position vis-a-vis England in the Atlantic during the eighteenth century. 
59 For these linkages, see Van Dillen (1970: 153-5). Regarding the role of analogous ties for 
England, see Bremer (1993: Chapter Four, especially 159-66, and Chapter Twelve). Merchant 
supply of slaves and the labor processes that were characteristic of plantation slave economies 
were closely entwined, since extending cultivation by means of adding more slaves was the 
prevalent form of expansion, as Van Zanden's figures on the relationship between numbers of 




At first glance, the midpoint of the seventeenth century was a time of brilliant success and 
consolidation for Dutch hegemony. The Golden Age seemed at its most lustrous. The ~ i ~ h t ~ - ~ e & s  
War with Spain concluded with the peace of Munster (164'7-48), a resounding victory for David 
over Goliath. The year 1650 marked Stadholder William 11's failed coup, and the inception of the 
first Stadholderless Era (1650-72), in which the Amsterdam merchant-regent elite guided policy 
jointly with Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt. The ~ u t c h  world-trade and financial system looked 
to be a s  healthy and stable as  ever.60 In the Atlantic region, Brazil was lost, but the Netherlands 
eventually controlled several Caribbean islands and parts of the .Guiana coast. The Dutch West 
Indies Conlpany was partially reconstituted and transformed in?o the Second 1Tweede) WIC, 
- retaining rights .(until the 1730sj.to supply. the remaining Dutch. colonies with .slaves.6 
In the Pacific, the 1650 General Instruction (Generaal Instructie) from the VOC directors 
..tozcentral- Asian headquarters.in Batavia codified the-strategic:and organizationaltprinciples that 
wou!d form the lynchpin of Dutch colonialism for the next century.62 Where the VOC had made 
conquests or signed monopoly "contracts" with Asian rulers, the company was to continue 
restricting the supply of key commodities to keep their sale prices high. In the spice islands, the 
core of the VOC territory, this strategy entailed the continuation of harsh policies regulating the 
60 See Israel 1989 (197-291) regarding the health of the system around 1650. Israel argues that 
Dutch commercial dominance lasted until after 1720. In contrast, on the basis of a combination of 
ratio and proportion measures of the Netherlands' share of global trade, Misra and Boswell (1993) 
put the end of Dutch hegemony in the late 1660s-early 1670s. They note, however, that their 
global trade measure is keyed to number of ships rather than cargo values, and is highly 
influenced by the larger numbers of ships with comparatively low-value cargoes in the Baltic 
trades. . . .. 
61 After that, it became a "body without a soul" (Emmer 1981: 82). Emrner's fine article argues 
that the WIC's post-1640s turn away from warmaking was a rational adapktion for the company 
W: 95). This paper adopts a different position, arguing that the "rationality" and outcome of 
the transformation must be evaluated with respect to the entire Dutch trading system, and not 
simply the WIC itself. 
62 See van der Chijs (1886: 135-57) for a copy of this document. 
involvement of Asian merchants and rulers, eliminating other European contenders, and limiting 
the production of indigenous producers. The company swept Asian traders out of some areas, such 
as the Java Sea and Ceylon coast, and restructured trade patterns according to company dictates 
in others. In what would prove a crucial move, the VOC successfully banned private trade by 
Dutch merchants in commodities of concern to the Company. Lastly, the VOC destroyed "excess" 
trees and converted direct producers into sharecroppers and, on occasion, slaves (Furber 1976: 50- 
2). These policies were undoubtedly effective. By the 1660s, the Company controlled the Europe-\ 
Asia trade in spices and dominated the relevant "country" (intra-Asian) trade. These 
achievements underlay the huge increase in the quantity of VOC trade and profits during this 
But amidst this cornucopia lay prospective problems. The most obvious, and oft-noted, 
?+f% 
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came from other European contenders envious of the Dutch trading system and desirous of 
.->.. 
sharing in more of its fruits.64 The Vetherlands faced increasing competition, a s  other states, 
-.v 
merchants and chartered companies emulated their Dutch counterparts, appropriating their 
? 3 2  - 
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politico-economic innovations, including shipbuilding and navigation techniques, forms of business 
. - and bank organization, agricultural advances, and of course the triangular trade system. 
- 7  
Competitor states also began to apply novel protectionist measures backed by mercantilist 
aggression. In what was but a foretaste of things to come, English merchants prevailed upon the 
Commonwealth state to pass the first of the protectionist Navigation Acts in 1651; together with 
the seizure of 140 Dutch ships a t  sea, it ignited the first Anglo-Dutch War (Brenner 1993: 625- 
63 In 1621, it had 67 ships in the Indies seas; in 1664, over 140 ships and 25,000 men on its 
payroll. For the general increase in profits, see Table 11 in Gaastra (1982: 119). The VOC 
consolidated its hold further by the 1680s. From its center a t  Batavia, it traded in Indonesian 
spices and Chinese, Persian and Indian silks, Japanese copper, Indian sugar, and other 
commodities. See Gaastra 1982: 37-52, 104-5, 109- 18; Arasaratnarn 1987: 124; and Furber 
1976: 42-64, 268-72. The company also founded the first colony in South Africa, a t  the Cape of 
Good Hope, in 1652. Boxer (1965: 2 73-30 1) provides an English-language summary. 
64 The envy owed something to contemporary mercantilist doctrine, which understood world trade 
as  a zero-sum game. See Heckscher (1955 ii: 23-6). Another important factor may have been the 
constraints on European markets imposed by feudal restrictions that were still prevalent in many 
areas of Europe (Brenner 1985). 
8).65 Perhaps most omihously, the ~ n ~ l i s h ;  French8and other statesy and corporations' 
simultaneous and a t  times collaborative attempts to'undercut Dutch influence formed a kind of 
, 
pincer movement that culminated in repeated wars and an attempted idasion in the so-called 
Disaster Year of 1672. These are essentially the factors stressed by world-systems 
theory, and recently by historians such as  Jonathan Israel, involving the diffusion of technical and 
organizational innovations, merchant struggles over trade, and interstate rivalry with an eye to 
securing commercial advantage, which a t  that historical juncture involved challenging the 
ubiquitous Dutch middleman.66 
International politico-economic pressures created by the rise of competitor nation states, in 
conjunction with the sunk costs involved in a vulnerable entrepot role, were certainly important 
. causes of Dutch downfall. But they were by no means the whole story of either the loss of 
. -hegemonic position or the,subsequent decline. Patrimonial structures of rule were also important 
causal mechanisms, and can be said to have contributed in several distinct ways. 
First,, as  the previous section made ~lear~~pztrimonial company structure and 
intzrcorporate struggles undermined the Atlantic branch of the commerciaVcolonial system, 
although the extent of the damage only became clear in the context of increasing English and 
French competition. Dutch merchants and the Dutch state were still able to make money out of 
the West Indies: a s  late a s  1750-74, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Zeeland derived an annual 
average of over ten million guilders revenue from Surinam imports alone (Goslinga 1985: 217-23). 
But the Netherlands lost their position a t  the leading edge of commerciaUcolonial expansion, which 
had shifted decisively to the Atlantic in the latter half of the seventeenth century. 
Although this first wave of English and French protectionism did not always accomplish its 
stated ends (see Israel 1992), it served as  a model for the formidable series of protectionist 
measures adopted in the early eighteenth century, by Scandinavia, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and 
other states. See Heckscher (1955 ii: 112-72). 
66 See Wallerstein (1974: Chapter Five) for an argument that Dutch hegemony ended when 
England (and to a lesser extent France) caught up technically and organizationally. Israel (1989: 
Chapter Seven) argues for the importance of other European states' protectionist policies and 
warmaking in the demise of Dutch hegemony. 
In the Pacific, the patrimonial distribution of privilege among politically-constituted 
corporations also took its toll. There the overwhelming success of the VOC's fused politico- 
economic structure imposed its own limits on Dutch development. Once a source of dynamism, it 
eventually prevented the company from harnessing the ascending, and ultimately victorious, 
forces of private trade. In the Dutch company's bailiwick, private trade continued to be severely 
curtailed, in spite of a drop in the VOC's country-trading fleet from 1690 to 1740. The VOC 
asserted its monopoly rights to both the "country" trade and the Europe-Asia route. The 
enforcement of the intra-Asian monopoly kept the number of Dutch private country ships a t  ten or 
under per season between 1713 and 1743 (Furber 1976: 275). This may not have damaged the 
company's trade in absolute terms, but it did so in a relative sense, for the English East India 
Company's intra-Asian trade far outstripped the VOC's in the eighteenth century. The VOC 
missed out on new commercial opportunities, notably the burgeoning tea trade, which was 
captured by the EIC instead (Furber 1976: 126). To add insult to injury, VOC employees began to 
smuggle goods for private profit with the help of the EIC U 275-83). By 1796, the English 
proportion of European "country" trade was estimated a t  90% of total traffic (Watson 1980: 85). 
Whqe  too much intercorporate struggle had helped defeat the D G h  West Indies Company, over- 
consolidation hampered its East Indies counterpart. 
Patrimonialism also placed strict limits on the further development of Dutch state 
capacity, and therefore on the ability of elites to address the politico-economic decline that followed 
the loss of hegemonic position.67 AS we have seen, privileges, including offices, drew 
particularistic elites, groups, communities and regions into the ambit of the state, and elites were 
politically identified with and sovereignty anchored in local councils, provincial states and 
chartered companies. The regents buttressed and built on the existing structure, subscribing 
mainly to local and provincial government loans (Riley 1980: 68-82; Fritschy 1988: Chapter One), 
67 The debate over whether the eighteenth-century Netherlands declined absolutely or relatively 
to other countries is an extensive one, and need not be dealt with here. For the debate, see Adams 
(1990). 
. . 
and ~ r e a t i * ~  new offices And privileges thatwere locally, a t  most provincielly, focussed.68  he 
spatial crystallization of privilege constructed the solidarity and integration that defines a nation 
along predominantly local lines (citizenship, for example, remained a local status, awarded by 
urban burgomasters, throughout the period under examination). 
This estatist structure inspired footdragging in policy-making. The tendency of the Dutch 
state toward temporizing played its part in handing England's Tory Party large politico-economic 
concessions in the Treaty of Utrecht (1715), which concluded the expensive Spanish Succession 
War, codified competfitorsY permanent inroads into the Dutch entrepot, and "marked a significant 
step towards Britain's supplanting of the Dutch a s  the world's dominant commercial power".69 
The structure also encouraged competition and squabbling among component parts, not only 
between the East and West Indies Companies; and+among locally-based-arms of those bodies, as 
- -we. have seen;. but also in other areas. Particularly relevant to the incapacity to address long-run 
commerciaYcolonial problems was the competition among the five overlapping naval admiralties, 
run by the regents and their-.provincial representatives: When the threat of war-andgressures on 
the entrepot worsened in the early eighteenth century, each admiralty responded by lowering its 
customs ra-tes, hoping to lure away trade from other localities, and this contributed to falling 
revenues, scarcer funds for the navy, and a decline in military readiness.70 In general, the 
68 Amsterdam mayors controlled the allocation of more than 3200 subaltern offices by the mid- 
eighteenth century (Bussemaker 1907), compared to the relatively low total of central state 
offices, an estimated 100-200 in the early seventeenth century, and only 300 in 1800, with some 
of the new officers appointed and paid by the provinces. ('t Hart 1993: 197) Elsewhere (Adams 
forthcoming), I argue that the desire to protect patrimonial lineage property and family reputation 
was an important motivation driving locally-focussed development. 
69 The quote is from Israel 1989 (375). Veenendaal (1980: 19-27) provides a useful summary of 
the Dutch position in and reaction to the Spanish Succession War. 
70 For estimated costs of the duplicate admiralty system, see 't Hart (1993: 205-6). Historians' 
estimates of evasions of the customs in the early eighteenth century range from 30-40% in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam to almost 80% in Zeeland (Joh. de Vries 1958; Westermann 1948). 
The rate of evasion appears to have.risen a s  well (Joh. de Vries 1958: 225-6). Fritschy discusses 
the falling customs intake (1988: 35). The customs are of most interest here because of their. 
direct impact on naval readiness, but note that the excise (gemeene middelen), the other important 
indirect tax, was subject to similar problems during this period (Aalbers 1977). On naval defense 
eighteenth century saw sustained intercorporate conflicts over the entangled issues of the decline 
of trade, foreign policy and public finance. The struggles within Holland prevented Amsterdam 
and the province from assuming their traditional leadership role (Porta 1975). The resulting 
insolvency of the Dutch treasury enforced a policy of neutrality vis-a-vis the other European 
powers from 1713 to 1795 (Carter 1975). Whether or not this was the most reasonable policy, the 
point is that'the patrimonial state-merchant nexus foreclosed other options. 
This fallout from estatism was less of a problem while other European states were 
similarly circumstanced. For a long while, in fact, the Netherlands held the advantage as  a 
merchant-controlled body, rather than one in which the crown dominated the estates, and an 
agrarian seigneurial elite appropriated patrimonial state offices (as in France or Spain), or where 
the uneasy balance between crown and estates, and the plurality of elites contending for a piece of 
- .\ 
politico-economic ,, -:.. privilege, made for an erratic history of supporting trade (pre-revolutionary 
England). But toward the end of the early modern period, when England in particular moved 
beyond patrimonial rule, this was no longer the case. 
L . . .  
These limits to Dutch state capacities were overdetermined by another consequence of 
patrimonial rule: the possession of patrimonial privileges changed the class character of the regent 
elite that held them. The dominant merchant class may have captured the Dutch state, but state 
structure and policies in turn restructured the perceived goals and interests of the governing elite 
along rentier capitalist lines.71 This is one further reason, contrary to the expectations of the- 
world-systems model, why ruling elites in the Netherlands and elsewhere cannot simply be 
assumed to deploy and restructure "strong" states a t  will, institutionalizing bureaucracies, 
a s  an "apple of discord" in the Republic, and its poor funding in the early eighteenth century, see 
Bartstra (1952: Chapter One). 
71 Whereas Amsterdam councillors and mayors had invested a negligible amount in state bonds in 
1600, a century later they were placing half of their wealth in bonds, mainly issued on Holland's 
public debt (Burke 1974). The regents of other towns for which information is available evince 
similar characteristics, with some variation according to the position of the town in the regional 
division of labor. On the general shift of the regency from trade to rentier capitalism, see Roorda 
(1964) and Van Dijk and Roorda (1971). With regard to the correlative movement inside the VOC 
directorship, see Adarns (1990): 
military rationalization, and public finance because they favor' the development of'trade. ~ h a t f  the 
Dutch elite failed to carry out many of these reforms was in part due to the fact that they were no 
. , 
longer merchants, and their perceived economic, political and familial wellbeing had come 
progressively uncoupled from the immediacies of trade. The more abstract point relevant to world- 
systems theory is that social roles and patterns of institutional and oppositional action should not 
be conceptualized as functionally impelled by sys&mic logics: they evolve, even within fixed 
functional limits. 
The Dutch position in the East Indies was the most enduring pillar of the Netherlands' 
world trading system and its global politico-economic power.72 Until the mid-eighteenth century, ' 
impressive economic and political inputs continued to flow from the VOC to the state, including 
- three million guilders for the charterArenewa1 of 1700-40, and over.400.000 fl. to the admiralties 
, . . ,.throughout tne century .(Gaastra 1982: 148; De Korte 1984: 6-8). Even. the VOC, however, was 
severely stressed by mid-century. The Safavid dynasty in 1722 inaugurated a long period of 
. .dynastic str~~ggles.and.instability in the:Indian*subcontinent; on which-the EIC eventually 
capitalized, with the aid of English and Dutch private traders. In the end, Pacific colonial strength, 
hollowed out from inside, ended with a bang rather than a whimper. The VOCYs overeign 
authority lapsed, notably in Bengal in 1759, when the Company sabotaged itself with an 
incompetent defence against English incursions, and in the fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-84). 
When the VOC appealed to the Dutch state for military support, the state was not able to muster 
an adequate fleet in defense. The VOC lost its key base on the Coromandel coast to the English. 
The total financial loss amounted to a staggering 60,000,000 guilders. The directors had to 
suspend payment on loans, and became completely dependent on the state for credit (Steur 1984: 
155-7). Infusions of cash came from the States of Holland, and from the Amsterdam town council. 
72 The market value of goods shipped from the East Indies, goods which were reexported 
throughout Europe, which had totalled 8.7 million guilders in 1648-50, topped 23 million in 1738- 
40, and 28.1 million in 1778 (Glamann 1958: 14). Besides pepper and spices, for which the VOC 
continued to set European prices until the 1 7 4 0 ~ ~  European demand skyrocketed for tea, coffee, 
and raw and processed silk and cotton. See Gaastra (1982). 
But by 1783, the spice monopoly was gone, and the English had secured de facto free trade in the 
Eastern seas.73 The fusion of politico-economic privilege and local elite goals had rendered the 
emergent Dutch state incapable of countering the strategic myopia of its leaders. 
G Q h  
The ground-breaking world-systems paradigm raises excellent questions about the source 
of the advantaged position of metropolitan countries, but, I have tried to show, the answers it 
returns are inadequate. To sum up, very briefly, the Dutch case demonstrates that the "strong 
state" as  defined by Wallerstein was not essential to securing the hegemonic position. 
Furthermore, and here we step decisively out of the world-systems paradigm, the state may be 
efficacious with respect to a particular commercial/colonial project, but the relative efficacy of that 
project cannot be defined in terms of its ultimate global success, as  world-systems theory defines 
it, else we have mere theoretical tautology. This paper has proposed that we substitute a macro- 
level, middle-range theory for the world-systems model, deriving the fundamental properties and 
dynamics of the subunits not from their functional location in the whole, but from the 
configuration of unevenly developing social structures and the struggles that took place within 
them and about them.74 In this reading, the social relations within the Dutch commerciaUcolonial 
system, those linking company merchants with global monopolistic ambitions, merchant 
interlopers fighting for a piece of the trade, and agrarian producers operating in a slave inode of 
production, are seen to be contested and causally consequential. But this paper has focussed more 
particularly on the role of an historically-specific interaction of patrimonial state and merchant 
elite in the rise of the Netherlands, and on the precarious but conjuncturally effective relationship 
of mutual support between the Dutch state and its satellite corporate bodies, notably the East and 
West Indies companies. Conversely, I have argued that the developing contradictions and conflicts 
73 See Dillo (1992) and Van Eyck van Heslinga (1988) regarding the end of the sovereign 
company, and the fate of its remnants up to 1806. 
74 On the desirability of theories of the middle range, see Merton (1967: 39-72). 
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among those corporate satellit& b d p t h e  Dutch state undermined the Atlantic component of the 
commerciaVcolonial system. This and other long-term consequences of Dutch estatist 
. . . . . . -  . . 
patrimonialism contributed '&I the loss of hegemony and subsequent decline of the early modern 
Netherlands. 
The inclusion of the patrimonial state-elite nexus as  an explanatory factor can also clarify 
differences in the developmental trajectory of other arcas or countries, notably Ehgland, a country 
that was in many respects economically similar to the Netherlands. In England, the balance 
between crown and estates prior to the Civil War, and the plurality of elites contending for a share 
of state privilege, inhibited the dominance of any single elite. Because elite power was more 
dispersed than in the Netherlands, a situation reinforced by patrimonial strategies, state 
tc-;,vulnerabi2it.y could not be-stably, exploited by-any one class or faction. This was reflected in the 
- ;-history of the East India .Company; which-logged an erratic history r?f support and attack from 
both Crown and Parliament before the Glorious ~eGolution, as  well as facing competition from the 
:increasingly:.established Dutch company; Its performance .was correspondingly uneven. 
But the shift beyond patrimonialism, confirmed by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, 
forged new limits under which state apparatuses were formed. After this point, patrimonial 
corporations such as  the East India Company existed in increasing tension with newer state 
structures, and with the executive's exercize of statutory control over commerciaVcolonial policy. 
In contrast to the early modern Netherlands, I would argue, state differentiation and integration 
endowed English commercial and colonial policy with greater capacity and flexibility. I t  did so via 
a number of mechanisms, among the most important of which were the replacement of 
patrimonial corporations with rule by statute and finance by the taxation of private individuals- 
and partnerships; and the displacement of venal office-holding by bureaucratic patterning of offices 
on the one hand, and a party patronage system which supplied incumbents to fill them on the 
other. State restructuring supplied the political and military conditions for a higher rate of 
mercantile profit, a s  well as guaranteeing that a higher percentage of profits kould reach the 
public exchequer. By these means, even convinced, isolationist Country Tories could be induced to 
3 9 
pay for an expensive "blue water policy" which underwrote the country's increased naval 
might.75 
The East India Company, a s  a transitional corporation embedded in state power and 
finance, was both a part of and increasingly a t  variance with the new thrust of rule. That 
incompatibility reached a tipping point with the inception of the Company's territorial rule and the 
resulting expansion of its patronage, and threat to its commercial and imperial stability. On the 
basis of the integrated rule and expanded capacity that i t  had attained, Parliament was able to 
begin to establish state sovereignty over the EIC -- and therefore India -- and to nationalize and 
bureaucratize its structures. Under these unique conditions, patrimonial state-merchant capital 
dynamics spurred empire-building, manufacturing capitalism, and state formation in the 
,a &r ..- metropole. Only then may patrimonial corporations like the East India Company be said to have 
-- - 
h- 265 
acted as  a "forced draught" fanning metropolitan development, as  Eric Hobsbawm metaphorically 
. .-, speculated (1967: 46-7, 53-6), rather than as a blast of chilly air inhibiting moves beyond 
traditional politico-economic organization, as  was the case in the   ether lands.^^ 
?$$ 
75 The English navy doubled its tonnage from 1714 to 1760, deploying up to 10,000 men in 
peacetime and over 100,000 a t  the time of the American War (Brewer 1989: 33), in contrast to 
the Dutch navy, which was increasingly undermanned, underequipped, and relatively backward 
technologically during this period. The classic source for the Dutch is De Jonge (1855-62 iv: 1- 
440). 
76 Ironically, the Netherlands contributed to its own displacement as hegemon, by means of the 
mechanisms outlined in this paper, of course, but also by providing plenty of cold cash. The 
English state increasingly depended on loans from Dutch citizens, estimated in 1776 to account for 
. fully L.59,000,000 of the total national debt of L. 143,000,000. Thus Wilson: "With the borrowed - 
profits from Holland's Golden Age, Britain gambled on an imperial future, and gambled 
successfully" (1949: 161). 
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